The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly referred to as the Iran Deal, was the product of decades of delicate, multi-lateral diplomacy and negotiations between many of the world’s most prominent and powerful actors. It was signed by Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the European Union with the purpose of preventing Iran from manufacturing and obtaining its own arsenal of nuclear weapons in return for relief of sanctions imposed on Iran by the other signatories, which were crippling its economy. Recently, the Trump administration has decided to pull the US out of the deal, despite objections from a majority of the global community as well as many within the US. If we look at this decision according to a rational decision-making model, while there may be some evidence to suggest that in this particular instance there is reason to believe otherwise, we must assume that these “hoof beats” are horses and not zebras, meaning that the leader is acting rationally in the interests of the nation, and not idiosyncratically based on personality or political calculation. Going by this assumption, one can posit that the decision makers considered several factors before making the decision to pull out of the deal. One likely factor considered was that the lifting of sanctions on Iran, in accordance with the JCPOA, was making it possible for the government of Iran to pursue the funding of organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria. Considering comments such as this: “The President should decline to certify – not primarily on the grounds related to Iran’s technical compliance, but rather based on the long catalogue of the regime’s crimes and perfidy against the United States…”(Oct 23rd, 2017) it is possible that the decision makers felt that this was putting an undue burden on US interests in the region, and putting allies opposed to the deal, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, in jeopardy and was therefore not in line with national interests. Based on comments such as the one from Senator Tom Cotton cited above, it can reasonably be assumed that the prescribed choice of action that would follow the rejection of the Iran Deal would be military intervention against Iran. This decision would be in line with the realist perspective of international relations on which the rational decision-making model is based. Speculating on the cognitive factors involved in this decision, when considering the overwhelming evidence suggesting that Iran was in fact complying with the terms of the agreement, based on reports from the United Nations nuclear agency inspectors monitoring reports, as well as the fact that the benefits of the US remaining within the terms of the JCPOA, certainly appear to outweigh the costs of refusing to remain within the terms of the agreement, it is possible that some cognitive dissonance may have played a factor. With the choice being to either have an Iran that was being heavily sanctioned and therefore resentful and adversarial towards the US and its allies, while also capable of un-monitored nuclear proliferation –or alternatively – to have an Iran willing to participate in negotiations and presumptively reasoned diplomacy in order to further take part in a global trade community and pursue the interests of its citizens and the nation overall, while simultaneously having its nuclear capabilities severely hampered and persistently monitored by UN nuclear inspectors, it would appear that another model of decision making may be in play. It is possible that the decision makers may have pursued what they see as being based on the rational model of decision making but is in fact a decision based on the “enemy image” belief set. This assumes that the perceived enemy is a calculating and inherently evil actor making decisions solely with the goal of advancing its own interest in the destruction of its adversary and that this actor will pursue this insidious agenda on every decision it makes. This theory is in line with the realist perspective commonly adhered to by the decision makers in question as well as the rhetoric they have publicly used to discuss this matter.
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