One of the most interesting and
concerning results of the UK’s Brexit referendum is the very troubling
implications of Brexit on the future of relations among Britain, Northern
Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland. Specifically, the possibilities in regard
to the future of the Irish state’s economy now that it no longer shares a
border with the rest of the European Union, the implications for migrants of
both Irish in Britain and British in Ireland, as well as the arguably, most
concerning possible re-igniting of historically violent tensions along the
border between the Republic and Northern Ireland. A significant aspect of this
is the precarious nature of the Irish economy, having been largely reliant on
its consistent place within a stable EU/UK/US relationship. Based largely on
its becoming somewhat of a tax haven with a reliable, English-speaking
workforce and close ties to all three markets during what was referred to by Morgan
Stanley as the “Celtic Tiger years” beginning in the 1990s, change in any of these
factors would bring into question its future growth and stability. Ireland’s
reliance on foreign investments in its tech sector, which accounts for a
significant portion of its expected future growth, could be put in a delicate
position if its border/taxation policies were to change as a result of its
neighbor’s exit from the EU common market. Not only would the position of
Ireland’s market be compromised, but as a result, tensions that have arisen because
of inequality between urban areas, which have seen consistent growth due to its
skilled-jobs market, as opposed to rural areas that have seen little economic
growth from this sort of market reliance, will likely increase. Infrastructure
in rural areas is one of the worst in the entire EU. Because of this, these
communities have developed an understandable resentment towards their urban
neighbors. In the wake of Brexit, Ireland would have to invest in the parts of
its economy it has come to rely on and hence, the inequalities seen between
regions will likely be further exacerbated. Another implication of Brexit for
Ireland is the questionable future of migration between the UK and Ireland as
well as the status of expatriates of one to another, which there are a
considerable number of both. What exactly the implications are regarding
migration are still unclear, but considering the fact that the political
climate around immigration was a significant factor in the results of the
Brexit referendum, there is cause for concern.
The border between Northern Ireland
and the Republic of Ireland is likely the greatest, most pressing concern for
Ireland in the wake of Brexit. The tenuous peace that was established in 1998
after the ‘Good Friday Agreement’, between the lower twenty-six counties that
make up the Republic of Ireland, and the upper six counties that comprise
Northern Ireland, could be compromised for several reasons. The history of
tensions, particularly along this border, have spanned centuries and have
erupted in sectarian violence as recently as the last decade. The aforementioned
‘Good Friday Agreement’, otherwise known as the Belfast Agreement was an
indisputably tumultuous and delicately crafted treaty that came after many attempts
and considerable bloodshed. The period before this agreement was settled has
become known as “The Troubles”. During this time there was a hard border in
place between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as well as exorbitant
tariffs on goods and services which were levied on any trade between the two
small countries sharing one island. The violence that erupted on numerous occasions,
instigated on both sides of the conflict and causing divisions among families
and governments alike, was finally brought to its precarious end when leaders
on both extremes were brought together to form a power sharing government in
Northern Ireland and the border was softened allowing passage and ending
tariffs. Although there are few examples anywhere in the world of such high
tensions and pervasive violence being as successfully sated as this was as a
result of the Belfast Agreement, there continues to be considerable tension
among [i]Nationalist/Republican
and Unionist/Loyalist political parties. Considering that Northern Ireland is a
part of the United Kingdom, which after Brexit is no longer part of the
European Union, and that the Republic of Ireland remains a member of the EU,
there is a very real possibility that a border of one kind or another could be
reinstated.
British Prime Minister Theresa May
has recently suggested that there could be a ‘frictionless border’ saying
“Nobody wants to return to the borders of the past”. Unsurprisingly, the
position of the Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP), the largest pro-Britain,
Unionist/Loyalist party in Northern Ireland, is in line with the British Prime
Minister as expressed by the DUP’s Chief Spokesman on Brexit (and member of the
British Parliament) Sammy Wilson: “It is entirely possible, using modern
technology to have these virtually frictionless borders - and they’ll not be
totally frictionless – there will have to be some checking, some paperwork, but
that’s all manageable.” While this myopically optimistic idea is comforting,
the historical and practical realities of re-establishing a border between the
states is fraught with distressingly manifest expectations. Considering the
border between the Republic and Northern Ireland will now be an official EU external
border, what is to suggest that the same rules that apply to places like
Hungary, which has recently seen the installation of razor fences and greater
implementation of rigorous securitization practices carried out by EU border
security organizations, would not apply on this infamously precarious border? As
stated by Gerry Adams, the President of Sinn Fein which is the main
Nationalist/Republican party: “The European Union, like any other federation or
any other state will want to protect itself. And there will be tariffs, there
will be economic penalties and there will be physical manifestations of a hard
border.”
In an inquiry[ii]
preparing for the possibility of a Brexit, the Northern Ireland Affairs
Committee of the House of Commons of the UK Parliament proposed three possible
options for how to deal with the border issue. First, is the ignominious ‘hard
border’ which would abandon the Common Travel Area (CTA) instituting security
checkpoints for trade and travel between the Republic and Northern Ireland – as
well as the rest of the UK. This would usher in all the issues presented above
as well as being financially and practically unsound for the UK government and
would alienate and re-ignite tensions with Nationalist/Republican communities. The
militarization involved in this option would be massive, requiring at least
enough manpower to securely monitor more than three hundred crossing points and
as many as 30,000 daily cross-border commuters, not to mention that under such
restrictions those commuters would become increasingly hostile. The second
option presented by the Parliamentary committee would be maintaining the
current status of an open border between the Republic and Northern Ireland and
instead, establishing security controls between the entire island of Ireland
and the rest of the UK. This option would effectively separate Northern Ireland
from the rest of the UK as well as necessitate Northern Ireland altering its
border policies to be comparable to those of the Republic’s. This option is
considerably more attractive to the UK government in terms of cost and
practicability because it would essentially be taking a hands-off approach to
its involvement with Northern Ireland. This option would be very appealing to
Nationalist/Republican communities as it is basically what they have always
wanted, but would infuriate Unionist/Loyalist communities as it would be moving
closer to a united island of Ireland and a separation from the UK. The third option
would retain the Common Travel Area (CTA) as it is now not withstanding any differences
in Ireland and UK immigration policies. This approach would require more
extensive data sharing with the UK as well as more rigorous internal
restrictions within the UK and a deep restructuring of UK policy and
enforcement procedures. While there has been some praise for this third option,
it seems unlikely that the new UK government would jump at the opportunity to
take what is likely to be the most complicated and therefore costly option as
far as legislative elbow-grease is concerned. The reason it may seem to be the
most palatable option is that it would neither especially satisfy nor alienate
any party involved. While that is
usually the mark of a successful compromise, this option also does not seem to
take into account the EUs recent tendency towards increased active involvement
in securitization of its external borders.
These three articles bring up a range
of issues revolving around the precarious nature of Ireland’s relationship
with, and place within the European Union as well the effects that the Brexit
referendum will have on this dynamic. Considering Ireland’s history of internal
conflict, managing its relations with the EU and simultaneously with the UK as
a separate entity will undoubtedly put Ireland in a delicate position. While
Ireland’s contentious relationship with the UK is obvious, Ireland has also had
its share of difficulties with the EU. Though it has seen its greatest period
of growth and prosperity under the policies, benefits, and protections of the
EU and its participation in the European single market, the questionable nature
of the EU’s democratic decision making processes may have given Irish citizens reason
to be wary of the EU governing body. But any reservations Ireland may have about
the EU, they pale in comparison to their feelings toward the UK. While there
are certainly many within Ireland that have a positive view of the UK and even
many more in Northern Ireland that see themselves as not only UK supporters,
but British loyalists, this sentiment has recently begun to waver for many. There
is growing reason to believe there may be a different trend growing as many
have become disillusioned with the UK after Brexit.
Ireland as a stable member of the EU
may be of pivotal importance to the EU in the coming years. While some may see the
results of the French presidential elections in April 2017 as a hopeful sign for
the EU, suggesting that the wave of isolationist populism that has swept the
globe was at its peak in the US election of Donald Trump and the Brexit
referendum, this is naïve. It is more likely that this trend is rising, not
peaking. In the last French election the far-right “National Front” party
received three million votes and this is when observers of politics started
getting worried. In this year’s election eleven million people voted for the
“National Front” party. This dramatic increase does not suggest a fizzling out
of this sort of anti-EU sentiment but only that it was not strong enough in the
isolated case of France. In 2017 we have the Italian election to look forward
to getting nervous about. The anti-EU sentiment is so strong in Italy, it makes
France look like Brussels (where the EU parliament is located). So there is no
reason to relax about the stability of the EU.
This populist trend began after the
financial crisis and is likely to continue to grow as was shown in Turner and
Cross’s analysis of attitudes toward immigration in Ireland. But while Turner and Cross used Ireland as a
case study, the generally pro-EU sentiment in Ireland does not suggest a
similar trend toward populism or isolationism from the Irish government or its
citizens. What is rather growing across the entire island of Ireland in the
wake of Brexit is anti-UK sentiment. Northern Ireland having voted 56% to
remain within the EU during the Brexit referendum, is seeing a historic
reversal in the popularity of the idea of leaving the UK and establishing a
united Ireland. This would grow the stability of the Irish economy not having
to deal with any of the UK’s restrictions, tariffs or policies leaving it to
independently deal with the EU as one nation on its own terms. The EU
leadership has also recently shown increased favorability toward Ireland and
would likely be thrilled if its economy were to grow and its political climate
were to reach a place of greater stability. This favorability should logically
even put to rest the fears of Unionist/Loyalist groups in Northern Ireland,
which suggest that a united Ireland separate from the UK would not be able to
stand on its own. But considering that the EU has a growing stake and
confidence in Ireland, not to mention the coalitions resentment toward the UK
after Brexit, it seems entirely plausible that the EU would be more than happy
to support the creation of a “United Ireland”. Calls for a referendum in Northern Ireland to
leave the UK and join the EU have been growing. There has even been some
preliminary polling which has begun to suggest substantial evidence that if it
were to take place, the majority would vote in favor of this idea that did not
even seem like a possibility a year ago. For many across the island of Ireland,
this would be a dream come true, validating all the struggle they have dealt
with for centuries being under the thumb of British imperialism and tyranny.
For many across the world, the creation of a ‘United Ireland’ and its
cooperation with the EU and participation within the single market would be the
one silver lining to come out of Brexit.
[i]
“Nationalist” referring to its position that it is independent from the UK, not
nationalist in the sense that it is isolationist or protectionist against
globalism, trade, or immigration as it might mean in other countries.
[ii]
Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, House of Commons, United Kingdom
Parliament, “Northern Ireland and the EU referendum”, First Report of
Session 2016-17, May 26, 2016
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