American politics got ya down? There's an important election in Germany coming up, and it's complicated AF!

            You may be saying to yourself: American politics are a total mess and I can’t handle paying attention to this shit-show, so what’s going on in global politics?

To which I would answer:

Hey NERD! Welcome, you’re amongst friends. But to answer your question, well, considering how the future of the European Union is, at very least, in a precarious position, all eyes turn to Germany as they prepare to hold their most consequential set of elections.

            To say that the various electoral processes and systems around the world are difficult to understand in comparison to one another would be a very fair statement. But to suggest that the German electoral and parliamentary system is particularly convoluted would be an understatement. At first glance, the process created to elect the members of the German government seems far more complicated and difficult than others, and possibly more so than necessary. But when you consider the… let’s say, regrettable (genocidal) kerfuffles… that have happened over the course of German history, it makes sense that the system that would be put in place in response to this dark history, would be intricate and as incorruptible and carefully constructed as possible.

So, alright fine, it makes sense for the German government to be delicately fashioned and cared for, but does it have to be such an indirect, multi-step, convoluted system? It may be hard to see how a system that seems to be even less of a direct democracy than the United States could be a preferable system for a country with a history of disastrous political decisions. But upon further examination of this complex system, it is hard not to see it’s clever and sensible benefits.

            The most important position in the executive branch is the Chancellor. This role, currently filled by Angela Merkel (known by some in Germany as “mummy” Merkel for her reputation as being a safe and stabilizing leader for more than a decade,) is comparable to the American President in that the Chancellor leads the country legislatively and politically. This is basically where the similarities end. The process for putting a Chancellor in power is entirely different from what most of us are familiar with in the US.

            The Chancellor is not even remotely “directly elected” by the German people. While in the US, there is a popular vote for the President, giving American voters the illusion of being personally responsible for the election of their leader, the German process for filling it’s highest office is purely representative democracy.

            So, if the German people do not elect the Chancellor, then why is this upcoming election important? Who are the German people voting for? How do the results effect the make-up of the German government? The answers to these questions become clearer by looking at the houses of the parliament, how the members of parliament are chosen and what the parliament is responsible for.

            Like many parliamentary systems, the German Parliament is broken into an upper house (Bundesrat) and a lower house (Bundestag). But different than many parliamentary systems, both houses are of relatively similar importance. This is due to their division of duties as well as their ability to act as checks and balances on the other, in much the same way that the US Senate and House of Representatives function together. The differences between the duties of the Bundesrat and the Bundestag are obviously important to know in order to understand the way the government works on a day to day basis. But while the specific differences do explain the reasons for such an intricate system, we’re only going to focus on what part they play in appointing a Chancellor.

            The Bundesrat is the smaller of the two houses and its members are chosen by direct democratic vote as the representative of a specific constituency within one of Germany’s sixteen states. The Bundesrat is essentially where the Federal and State governments converge to hear what the other has to say and work together to promote cohesion between the two. The function that the Bundesrat provides in the context of appointing a Chancellor is their role in choosing Germany’s President.

Yep, Germany also has a President.

While there are some very consequential powers that the President does technically have, (dissolving the Bundestag, vetoing laws,) it is very rare for this to happen in practice. Mostly making state visits and entertaining important visitors to the country, the role of the President is largely ceremonial, except for one job. It is the President, elected by the Bundesrat, who appoints their choice for Chancellor which will then be voted on by the lower house of Parliament, the Bundestag.

            The Bundestag is the larger of the two houses of Parliament and is the focus of the upcoming German election. The impending “Bundestagswahl”, or general election, will determine the proportional representation of political parties within the Bundestag. Since no one party is likely to hold a majority on its own within the house, the need for coalition building between disparate parties becomes necessary to create a majority that can generate the votes required to pass laws and enact legislation.

The electing of representatives to the Bundestag is where it may begin to feel like I’m just messing with you. I assure you, I am not.

Every German voter is given a ballot with two votes they can make. The first vote is a straight forward vote for a single person, with or without a party affiliation, whom the voter would like to represent their constituency in the Bundestag. The winner of this first vote, within a constituency, in a state, is automatically given a seat in the Bundestag.

The second vote on the ballot is a vote for a political party, not an individual. The second vote determines how many seats each political party will hold in the house in comparison to one another. The number of political parties with representation in the Bundestag is determined by how many parties received at least five percent of the vote during the Bundestagswahl. The lowest number of parties represented in this body since the enactment of this system was three, during the 1960’s. There have been periods during which there have been five parties represented, but currently there are four parties represented in the Bundestag. There is a strong possibility that there may be six after this next Bundestagswahl. The total number of representatives also changes depending on the apportionment of party representatives. While the base number is 598 representatives from different parties, there are currently 631 seats and that number may grow to 800 depending on the results of the election.

            I know, that wasn’t a ton of fun, but now we’re getting somewhere. So now that:

1.     the Bundesrat has chosen a President,

2.     the President has appointed their choice for Chancellor,

3.     the members of the Bundestag have been voted into their seats,

4.     the parties have compromised with each other and coalesced into groups, one being large enough to establish a majority,

then finally, that majority coalition can now vote to elect the President’s appointment for Chancellor.

Essentially, the results of the Bundestagswahl will determine the political landscape of the German Parliament, the coalitions that will form between parties and the legislative compromises they will have to make to form them, and therefore, who will be elected as Chancellor.

Based on recent polling, currently it is looking very likely that some form of coalition including Angela Merkel’s “Christian Democrat Union” (CDU) party will be able to form after the election and therefore Merkel will remain chancellor for her fourth consecutive term. But considering how we have seen such shocking political upheavals across the world, (Trump, Brexit, the close race between Macron and LePen in France,) it is certainly worth keeping an eye on the precarious nature of any, and all powerful governments, across the world. Especially when it comes to the richest and most influential country in the EU. That is why this upcoming election on September 24^th matters.

Brexit Fallout: The Implications of the U.K.'s Referendum for Ireland

One of the most interesting and concerning results of the UK’s Brexit referendum is the very troubling implications of Brexit on the future of relations among Britain, Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland. Specifically, the possibilities in regard to the future of the Irish state’s economy now that it no longer shares a border with the rest of the European Union, the implications for migrants of both Irish in Britain and British in Ireland, as well as the arguably, most concerning possible re-igniting of historically violent tensions along the border between the Republic and Northern Ireland. A significant aspect of this is the precarious nature of the Irish economy, having been largely reliant on its consistent place within a stable EU/UK/US relationship. Based largely on its becoming somewhat of a tax haven with a reliable, English-speaking workforce and close ties to all three markets during what was referred to by Morgan Stanley as the “Celtic Tiger years” beginning in the 1990s, change in any of these factors would bring into question its future growth and stability. Ireland’s reliance on foreign investments in its tech sector, which accounts for a significant portion of its expected future growth, could be put in a delicate position if its border/taxation policies were to change as a result of its neighbor’s exit from the EU common market. Not only would the position of Ireland’s market be compromised, but as a result, tensions that have arisen because of inequality between urban areas, which have seen consistent growth due to its skilled-jobs market, as opposed to rural areas that have seen little economic growth from this sort of market reliance, will likely increase. Infrastructure in rural areas is one of the worst in the entire EU. Because of this, these communities have developed an understandable resentment towards their urban neighbors. In the wake of Brexit, Ireland would have to invest in the parts of its economy it has come to rely on and hence, the inequalities seen between regions will likely be further exacerbated. Another implication of Brexit for Ireland is the questionable future of migration between the UK and Ireland as well as the status of expatriates of one to another, which there are a considerable number of both. What exactly the implications are regarding migration are still unclear, but considering the fact that the political climate around immigration was a significant factor in the results of the Brexit referendum, there is cause for concern.

The border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland is likely the greatest, most pressing concern for Ireland in the wake of Brexit. The tenuous peace that was established in 1998 after the ‘Good Friday Agreement’, between the lower twenty-six counties that make up the Republic of Ireland, and the upper six counties that comprise Northern Ireland, could be compromised for several reasons. The history of tensions, particularly along this border, have spanned centuries and have erupted in sectarian violence as recently as the last decade. The aforementioned ‘Good Friday Agreement’, otherwise known as the Belfast Agreement was an indisputably tumultuous and delicately crafted treaty that came after many attempts and considerable bloodshed. The period before this agreement was settled has become known as “The Troubles”. During this time there was a hard border in place between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as well as exorbitant tariffs on goods and services which were levied on any trade between the two small countries sharing one island. The violence that erupted on numerous occasions, instigated on both sides of the conflict and causing divisions among families and governments alike, was finally brought to its precarious end when leaders on both extremes were brought together to form a power sharing government in Northern Ireland and the border was softened allowing passage and ending tariffs. Although there are few examples anywhere in the world of such high tensions and pervasive violence being as successfully sated as this was as a result of the Belfast Agreement, there continues to be considerable tension among [i]Nationalist/Republican and Unionist/Loyalist political parties. Considering that Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom, which after Brexit is no longer part of the European Union, and that the Republic of Ireland remains a member of the EU, there is a very real possibility that a border of one kind or another could be reinstated.

British Prime Minister Theresa May has recently suggested that there could be a ‘frictionless border’ saying “Nobody wants to return to the borders of the past”. Unsurprisingly, the position of the Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP), the largest pro-Britain, Unionist/Loyalist party in Northern Ireland, is in line with the British Prime Minister as expressed by the DUP’s Chief Spokesman on Brexit (and member of the British Parliament) Sammy Wilson: “It is entirely possible, using modern technology to have these virtually frictionless borders - and they’ll not be totally frictionless – there will have to be some checking, some paperwork, but that’s all manageable.” While this myopically optimistic idea is comforting, the historical and practical realities of re-establishing a border between the states is fraught with distressingly manifest expectations. Considering the border between the Republic and Northern Ireland will now be an official EU external border, what is to suggest that the same rules that apply to places like Hungary, which has recently seen the installation of razor fences and greater implementation of rigorous securitization practices carried out by EU border security organizations, would not apply on this infamously precarious border? As stated by Gerry Adams, the President of Sinn Fein which is the main Nationalist/Republican party: “The European Union, like any other federation or any other state will want to protect itself. And there will be tariffs, there will be economic penalties and there will be physical manifestations of a hard border.”

In an inquiry[ii] preparing for the possibility of a Brexit, the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee of the House of Commons of the UK Parliament proposed three possible options for how to deal with the border issue. First, is the ignominious ‘hard border’ which would abandon the Common Travel Area (CTA) instituting security checkpoints for trade and travel between the Republic and Northern Ireland – as well as the rest of the UK. This would usher in all the issues presented above as well as being financially and practically unsound for the UK government and would alienate and re-ignite tensions with Nationalist/Republican communities. The militarization involved in this option would be massive, requiring at least enough manpower to securely monitor more than three hundred crossing points and as many as 30,000 daily cross-border commuters, not to mention that under such restrictions those commuters would become increasingly hostile. The second option presented by the Parliamentary committee would be maintaining the current status of an open border between the Republic and Northern Ireland and instead, establishing security controls between the entire island of Ireland and the rest of the UK. This option would effectively separate Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK as well as necessitate Northern Ireland altering its border policies to be comparable to those of the Republic’s. This option is considerably more attractive to the UK government in terms of cost and practicability because it would essentially be taking a hands-off approach to its involvement with Northern Ireland. This option would be very appealing to Nationalist/Republican communities as it is basically what they have always wanted, but would infuriate Unionist/Loyalist communities as it would be moving closer to a united island of Ireland and a separation from the UK. The third option would retain the Common Travel Area (CTA)  as it is now not withstanding any differences in Ireland and UK immigration policies. This approach would require more extensive data sharing with the UK as well as more rigorous internal restrictions within the UK and a deep restructuring of UK policy and enforcement procedures. While there has been some praise for this third option, it seems unlikely that the new UK government would jump at the opportunity to take what is likely to be the most complicated and therefore costly option as far as legislative elbow-grease is concerned. The reason it may seem to be the most palatable option is that it would neither especially satisfy nor alienate any party involved.  While that is usually the mark of a successful compromise, this option also does not seem to take into account the EUs recent tendency towards increased active involvement in securitization of its external borders.

These three articles bring up a range of issues revolving around the precarious nature of Ireland’s relationship with, and place within the European Union as well the effects that the Brexit referendum will have on this dynamic. Considering Ireland’s history of internal conflict, managing its relations with the EU and simultaneously with the UK as a separate entity will undoubtedly put Ireland in a delicate position. While Ireland’s contentious relationship with the UK is obvious, Ireland has also had its share of difficulties with the EU. Though it has seen its greatest period of growth and prosperity under the policies, benefits, and protections of the EU and its participation in the European single market, the questionable nature of the EU’s democratic decision making processes may have given Irish citizens reason to be wary of the EU governing body. But any reservations Ireland may have about the EU, they pale in comparison to their feelings toward the UK. While there are certainly many within Ireland that have a positive view of the UK and even many more in Northern Ireland that see themselves as not only UK supporters, but British loyalists, this sentiment has recently begun to waver for many. There is growing reason to believe there may be a different trend growing as many have become disillusioned with the UK after Brexit.

Ireland as a stable member of the EU may be of pivotal importance to the EU in the coming years. While some may see the results of the French presidential elections in April 2017 as a hopeful sign for the EU, suggesting that the wave of isolationist populism that has swept the globe was at its peak in the US election of Donald Trump and the Brexit referendum, this is naïve. It is more likely that this trend is rising, not peaking. In the last French election the far-right “National Front” party received three million votes and this is when observers of politics started getting worried. In this year’s election eleven million people voted for the “National Front” party. This dramatic increase does not suggest a fizzling out of this sort of anti-EU sentiment but only that it was not strong enough in the isolated case of France. In 2017 we have the Italian election to look forward to getting nervous about. The anti-EU sentiment is so strong in Italy, it makes France look like Brussels (where the EU parliament is located). So there is no reason to relax about the stability of the EU.

This populist trend began after the financial crisis and is likely to continue to grow as was shown in Turner and Cross’s analysis of attitudes toward immigration in Ireland.  But while Turner and Cross used Ireland as a case study, the generally pro-EU sentiment in Ireland does not suggest a similar trend toward populism or isolationism from the Irish government or its citizens. What is rather growing across the entire island of Ireland in the wake of Brexit is anti-UK sentiment. Northern Ireland having voted 56% to remain within the EU during the Brexit referendum, is seeing a historic reversal in the popularity of the idea of leaving the UK and establishing a united Ireland. This would grow the stability of the Irish economy not having to deal with any of the UK’s restrictions, tariffs or policies leaving it to independently deal with the EU as one nation on its own terms. The EU leadership has also recently shown increased favorability toward Ireland and would likely be thrilled if its economy were to grow and its political climate were to reach a place of greater stability. This favorability should logically even put to rest the fears of Unionist/Loyalist groups in Northern Ireland, which suggest that a united Ireland separate from the UK would not be able to stand on its own. But considering that the EU has a growing stake and confidence in Ireland, not to mention the coalitions resentment toward the UK after Brexit, it seems entirely plausible that the EU would be more than happy to support the creation of a “United Ireland”.  Calls for a referendum in Northern Ireland to leave the UK and join the EU have been growing. There has even been some preliminary polling which has begun to suggest substantial evidence that if it were to take place, the majority would vote in favor of this idea that did not even seem like a possibility a year ago. For many across the island of Ireland, this would be a dream come true, validating all the struggle they have dealt with for centuries being under the thumb of British imperialism and tyranny. For many across the world, the creation of a ‘United Ireland’ and its cooperation with the EU and participation within the single market would be the one silver lining to come out of Brexit.

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[i] “Nationalist” referring to its position that it is independent from the UK, not nationalist in the sense that it is isolationist or protectionist against globalism, trade, or immigration as it might mean in other countries.

[ii] Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, House of Commons, United Kingdom Parliament, “Northern Ireland and the EU referendum”, First Report of Session 2016-17, May 26, 2016