Democracy is regarded by many, as the
morally preferable form of governance in the world today. In a democracy, the
rules, laws, and norms are set, not by an omniscient higher power, but by the
consensus of a free and equal public. This consensus is guided to its status as
agreed upon by a majority, through verifiable truths and facts held efficacious
as to the acceptance of their validity by this public sphere. It is on this
notion that democracy is given credence. But this is a precarious and
vulnerable assumption. This belief in democracy relies on several concepts that
are not intrinsically reliable; The “consensus of a majority”, a “free and
equal public”, “truth” and “fact” – all are undefined and are open to infinite interpretation.
Depending on the way each of these concepts is interpreted, the entire
definition of democracy is rendered malleable. How then, do we hold such faith
in a form of government where the means by which its governance is given
authority are dictated by such abstract concepts? Is public opinion truly a
reliable arbiter of “truth”? Does the public sphere form a consensus based on
what is agreed upon by those who are educated and who have expertise in the
field in question, or by the opinions of those the public is most ideologically
aligned with? If the majority opinion in the realm of the public sphere is the
standard by which we should be governed, how then does the majority come about
discovering this consensus? Where and how does the public draw the line between
“truth” and its opposite? In American democracy today, the norms by which the
public sets its standards are undoubtedly in question. Do we welcome this shift
because it breaks down the systems and institutions that have oppressed so many
for so long, or do we fear the destruction of a society that holds education
and the pursuit of knowledge as the arbiters of what we hold to be “true”?
In order to better understand
democracy and how it functions with culture and society, there are two
overarching areas that require further investigation. First, the “public
sphere” and its emergence as a sovereign political and cultural entity requires
further explanation. Secondly, “truth” and how it is discovered must be explored.
Finally, once these concepts have been further elucidated, their relationship
to one another and the effect of this amorphous union on democracy becomes perceivable.
While these concepts have been the subject of philosophical debate for
centuries, in order to view them in the context of more contemporary
philosophical thought and the politics of democracy in the modern era, works by
two German contemporaries in the latter half of the 20th century, provide
relevant perspective.
In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere – An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society[1],
Jürgen Habermas – a luminary of the Frankfurt School and its notion of Critical
Theory – uses the example of the emergence of an educated and politically
invested bourgeois class in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries to investigate the concept of a “public sphere”. Described as “…a disillusioning
book for those who believed in democracy[2],”
Habermas’s description of the perpetual shifting of the public sphere’s
strength, influence, consistency, or lack thereof, illustrates the impact of an
educated public on the decision-making process in government and culture. In
providing a definition of the “public sphere” Habermas details the various
etymological origins of establishing this terminology which served as the
predominant focus across much of his writing. He most simply describes it as
“the sphere of public authority[3],”
but goes on to distinguish this broad definition by explaining that the word
“public” on its own had been previously used exclusively to describe things
that were “state related.” This rigid definition of public did not allow for,
or expect the integration of the public into political life. So as this started
becoming a phenomenon, a distinction between a “private sphere” as opposed to a
“public sphere” became important. In order to expand on this, Habermas uses the
ideas of his contemporary, and fellow German political theorist – “Hannah
Arendt refers to this private sphere of
society that has become publicly relevant when she characterizes the modern
(in contrast to the ancient) relationship of the public sphere to the private
in term of the rise of the ‘social’: ‘Society is the form in which the fact of
mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public
signifigance, and where the activities connected with sheer survival are
permitted to appear in public[4].’”
As Arendt’s works on the topic of political truth are the basis for the
understanding of the meaning of truth in this paper, Habermas’s use of Arendt
to explain this transition in his definition of the public sphere are
particularly noteworthy. What began to grow from this “society” began to more
closely resemble what would later become a “public sphere” involved in the
political business of governance. This evolution from a public being solely a
reference to state activities without any involvement from a wider common public into something that was meant
to be representative of the public’s opinion and preference necessitated a
redefining of the terms. This development, as Habermas displays at length
throughout The Structural Transformation
of the public sphere was owed largely to the rise of the educated and
wealthy, but originally unrepresented bourgeois class.
In detailing the rise of a
knowledgeable and politically involved intellectual citizenry, Habermas
explains the relationship of this emergent class in contrast to the aristocracy
from which it was wresting political power and cultural relevance. As this
shift began, the intellectual bourgeois public began to inhabit some of the
same social circles and cultural events that had before been limited to the
aristocratic royalty. Because of this, there “ …began to emerge between
aristocratic society and bourgeois intellectuals, a certain parity of the
educated[5].”
This new commons populated by two formerly unassociated classes was a first
step in loosening the grip of the established aristocracy on their exclusive
access to the levers of political influence. While this new forum was exclusive
to the wealthiest classes of the population, as the majority of the people were
not members of this bourgeois class, the breaking down of barriers for one
group presaged a structural change that would lead to a new meaning of what the
public sphere would one day become.
In today’s context, there are similarities
to the way that many among the American public view “the establishment” as an
aristocracy that must be overthrown. The election of Donald Trump in 2016,
shows a distinctly converse overthrow of power dynamics than the bourgeois ascendance
to political relevance. While the bourgeoisie drew their power from a greater
knowledge and understanding of the world and specifically politics through
education and acceptance of discoverable information and deductive reasoning,
where “they knew of no authority beside that of the better argument,”[6]
the public’s, at least tacit acceptance if not enthusiastic fervor for a man
with no knowledge of politics and who has been described by so many, even reportedly
by some within his own administration, as a “f***ing idiot”, portrays a strikingly
different dynamic at work. Whereas those who are responsible for Trump’s
ascendance to political relevance see “the establishment” and “the deep state”
as an entrenched aristocracy, those opposed to his rise see a new kind of
aristocracy being created, an aristocracy that more closely resembles the
aristocracy that Habermas references. This is an aristocracy that is not deemed
worthy of power based on its superior knowledge or its greater pursuit of
factual truth, but based on its popularity. This is a fame aristocracy. Donald Trump is not the only example of the
public’s reverence for the fame
aristocracy. The popularity of the Kardashians and their ever-increasing
propensity to dictate the standards in American culture has seemed to some to
be nothing more than an unsophisticated allure for an unimportant segment of
the public sphere. But just as Donald Trump was seen as a joke at the beginning
of his candidacy, the influence of the Kardashians on American culture is
beginning to evolve into a more consequential development. While many have
dismissed the Kardashians’ status as a noteworthy member of this “fame
aristocracy,” there are comparisons to be drawn from Habermas’s quote from Alewyn’s
Das Gross Welttheater. In his depiction
of the beginnings of the bourgeoisie’s rise to figures of public prominence,
the aristocracy at the time bore a striking resemblance to the Kardashians in
their similar affinity for displaying themselves to a rapt public, eagerly
awaiting a glimpse into the lives of these aristocrats – “…the royal bedroom
develops into the palace’s second center…the scene of the daily ceremonies of lever and coucher, where what is most intimate is raised to public importance[7].”
While the Kardashians’ interpretation of “Levee” – taking the form of their
popular reality television show, Keeping
up with the Kardashians, and their presence on social media – may appear
crude in comparison to the courtly custom practiced by kings and royalty, even
up to the early presidents in nineteenth century America, it seeks to promote
the same goal of giving the public an intimate look into the lives of these
famous and enviable elite aristocrats so as to make them relatable and thus
sympathetic in their familiarity.
In discussing the public sphere, and
especially its relationship with how information dissemination plays a role in
creating opinion and defining truth, the importance that media and the press
plays is crucial. Habermas details the growth of the media as a means of public
information as being a direct result of the rise of capitalism and that as
capitalism grew and became more free and ubiquitous, so too did the media – one
being directly responsible for and simultaneously dependent on the other. In
reference to “the acquisition of luxury goods made available through long
distance trade…into dependence on the new capital,” Habermas explains, “the
traffic in news that developed alongside the traffic in commodities showed a
similar pattern. With the expansion of trade, merchants’ market oriented
calculations required more frequent and more exact information about distant
events…The great trade cities became at the same time centers for the traffic
in news; the organization of this traffic on a continuous basis became imperative to the degree to which the
exchange of commodities and of securities became continuous. Almost
simultaneously with the origin of stock markets, postal services and the press
institutionalized regular contacts and regular communications[8].”
This devolpment of the media as being so inexorably linked to the rise of
capitalism explains a lot about the state of today’s media landscape – both for
good and bad. The way that the media is so often criticized as being corrupt
and biased makes a lot of sense considering it was created solely for the
purpose of promoting economic wealth. This explains, and essentially gives
credence to the argument that the news which a media company chooses to
disseminate to the public is likely, if not obviously, related to the opinions
of the corporation that owns the particular media company. This problematic
arrangement that developed due to the fact that the media owes its existence to
the free market in the first place, is a source of widespread skepticism and
distrust for the media on the whole. This distrust of media has become a key
element in politics globally today. Around the world, many countries,
particularly those with authoritarian leadership, have state run media
companies who broadcast information on the express permission of the
government. One example of this is the Russian state-run news company, RT,
effectively dictating the information that the insulated Russian public sphere
is aware of. This is one factor that has played a role in the fact that
Vladimir Putin has been so overwhelmingly – though likely not legitimately –
elected over and over again, and depicted as loved by his people. In the US,
our news, press and media organizations and corporations are criticized on the
basis of each one having a partisan bias. The right has their preferred sources
that confirm their biases and the left, their own. The problem that this
creates is a similar problem to the one involved in the Protestant Reformation
– “the problem of many authorities.” We have all driven ourselves into
disparate bubbles – or spheres – of confirmation bias; These public spheres of
our own design, where the things we believe and agree with, are confirmed and
satiated over and over again, do not allow for much dissenting opinion, as this
would cause the loyal viewers of these media outlets to be assaulted by views
that do not align with their own, thus betraying their delicate sensibilities.
In doing this we trap ourselves in a place where only the things that make us
comfortable are the things we hear, creating multiple authorities with multiple
views of the “truth”.
As Habermas accounts, by the middle
of the seventeenth century the bourgeoisie were relishing in the apparent
success of their rise in that it allowed for the establishment of a civil law
based on the needs of a free market. “The society solely governed by the laws
of the free market presented itself not only as a sphere free from domination
but as one free from any kind of coercion[9].”
While this idea of the infallibility of a free market is obviously the subject
of considerable contention as it does not account for the lack of parity in
terms of diversity of participants, it must be conceded that it did indeed allow
for the degrading of the royal aristocracy and the dawning of a system based on
the needs of a public sphere involved in the market and guided by societal
norms. The concept of norms is the
idea that over time, a society builds a set of standard operating procedures for
behavior, based on societally acceptable acquiescence to basic, widely
understood practices. These norms are not written law but rather an
undocumented, yet ubiquitously recognized, set of standards for participating
within a society. As they are not official, judicative laws that are
enforceable in the sense that they would be tried by a state judiciary based on
legal precedent or binding document, norms are more like an understood
awareness of the standards by which one is expected to behave in public. More
often than not, these norms are followed because the penalty accrued as a
result of breaking from these societal norms is disrepute and rebuke from a
majority of the public sphere. But these consequences only matter if the person
who rejects these norms has a sense of humility and an aversion to shame. In
the case of many in this fame aristocracy,
they see themselves as being above the realm of the public sphere because they
have accumulated such renown within this sphere. They do not feel that they are
capable of being shamed by those who are not in this ascendant sphere they have
created for themselves, and thus, lack the humility necessary to be punished
for ignoring norms. Because society accepts
these norms and generally avoids breaking them for fear that they would be
ostracized by the public sphere, we did not foresee the dilemma that we face in
a fame aristocracy immune to adjudication by public shame. The result of this
oversight is most notably perceptible in that we have seen Donald Trump
completely destroy these norms on a daily basis. I say “destroy” because their
validity rests on their ubiquitous acceptance and persistent adherence. When
someone who embodies a cult of personality, with a devoted and sizeable base of
implacable loyalists, and is legally nearly untouchable – being that he is the
President of the most powerful sovereign nation in the world, there is not only
little recourse to hold him accountable, but the norm he disregards ceases to
be a norm. It has now been proven to be avoidable without repercussion and has
therefore lost its power. While some of the Presidential norms that he has
rendered impotent are simply formalities and really only ever served to instill
gravitas in the office of the president, there are others that have immediate,
as well as lasting consequences. While the latter may be more alarming – and
even considering that there are many who might welcome the upending and
rewriting of some of these inconsequential formalities, as they see the
destruction of some of these obsequiously followed relics of a bygone era to be
progress – by invalidating any of these norms, they are all brought under scrutiny
and are now subject to the same fate.
Habermas’s description and
explanation of the development of the public sphere and its influence on the
levers of government may be seen as an elitist perspective because it speaks so
highly of this ascendant bourgeoisie class and praises their education as being
the vehicle for this ascendance. This is not an incorrect assessment in that he
does not address at much length the concept of whether there is equal access to
education across the range of socio-economic statuses or racial groups. But
while there may be some elements that would be exceedingly relevant were he to
have been writing in the cultural climate of today’s America, his emphasis on
the educational proclivities of the bourgeoisie seek to show the importance of
knowledge to the acquisition of power. Habermas shows us that it is an educated
and well-informed public sphere, open to a free exchange of ideas, that gives
democracy credibility and functionality.
The subject of “truth” is most
simply characterized by one’s definition of its opposite. It is here that emerges
the particular flavor of truth one is referring to. To explain the importance
of this distinction, Hannah Arendt’s essay published in the New Yorker in 1967, Truth and Politics[10],
gives a very clear elucidation of these varieties of truth. To be clear, while I
seek to avoid attempting to engage with the centuries-old epistemological or
metaphysical discussions around the concept of truth, I am aware that I may risk
invoking some related arguments.
The most consequential distinction
in the definitions of truth that Arendt provides is the difference between rational truth, which she describes as
encompassing philosophical, mathematical and scientific truth, to what she labels factual truth. Factual truth is the category of truth that involve facts
relating to events and the actions of human beings. Arendt explains that it is
factual truth that is of primary consequence to a discussion of truth in the
political realm, as it is within this realm that human actions and associated
events reside. It is the notion of Vita
Contempletiva, where the spectator
may ponder the more esoteric rational truths, while the politician, as an actor, must remain within the confines
of Vita Activa to toil over the
factual truths that have been passed to them by the spectator. This distinction
is of the greatest importance for this discussion in that it allows us to give
a definition to truth’s opposite within the context of factual truth. As Arendt
posits – “Deliberate falsehood, the plain lie, plays its role only in the
domain of factual truth[11].”
Now that we can be clear about which truths we are involved with and that the
opposite of these factual truths is the intentional and purposeful untruth, it
is possible to understand why such a distinction must be made in such a
laborious fashion. With this we may now label the liar as the enemy of truth
and that a lie may take many forms. For example – “The blurring of the dividing
line between factual truth and opinion belongs among the many forms that lying
can assume[12],”
in other words, portraying the truth as opinion, or less gracefully resigning
it to the disgraced rank of “fake news,” is what gives the liar the ability to
create a “truth” that aligns with his opinion. Because of this, Arendt explains
– “Since the liar is free to fashion his ‘facts’ to fit the profit and
pleasure, or even the mere expectations, of his audience, the chances are that
he will be more persuasive than the truthteller[13].”
It is this idea that keeps many Americans, who are not taken in by the allure
of Trump, awake at night, worried that our society is becoming a society based
on lies or that perhaps it always has had the capacity to be so.
Though this is may cause despair
for the seeker of knowledge and pursuer of truths, there is solace to be found in
a society based on lies, for in a society based on lies, the reality of truth
will destroy the illusion that is necessary to maintain a society based on
lies. When one truth so powerful and undeniable is introduced into the society
based on lies, the whole framework that allowed for the promulgation of lies in
the first place is dealt an unrecoverable blow and ideally, is not able to
withstand any such an attack on its foundational infrastructure. Hence, the
power based on the credibility of the liar is now suspect to the audience who
revere the liar. It would be through this assumption that one in the grip of
despair for American democratic legitimacy, might cobble together some
semblance of hope that some form of truth will one day prevail. Though it may
be hard to believe that there is hope in the truth when one engages in
emotional self-preservation and has been beaten into perceiving the world through
the veil of cynicism, there is historical evidence to suggest that there indeed
may be some to be found, assuming of course that history is not written away by
the liar, and the historian executed.
In relation to this fame aristocracy, Arendt, in her
examination of the liar, discusses the liar’s tendency to build around
themselves, an image. This carefully groomed image ideally provides them with
the base of what becomes a “cult of personality” and gives their statements and
opinions, not so much a basis for, but a reference to trustworthiness. “…the
more successful a liar is, the more likely it is that he will fall prey to his
own fabrications…Only self-deception is likely to create a semblance of
truthfulness, and in a debate about facts the only persuasive factor that
sometimes has a chance to prevail against pleasure, fear, and profit is personal
appearance[14].”
This cultivation of image ties back to the discussion of the media and how many
authoritarian governments use the media to create an image for the leader. As I
noted earlier, this is seen in Russian state-run media in creating a mythos
around Vladimir Putin among the population of Russia and also broadcast to the
world who hopefully take these state-sanctioned public relations messages with
a grain of salt. This is also seen in the “Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea” – which is known to the rest of the world as not even remotely a
democracy, and might be more honestly referred to as the Brutal Totalitarian
Dictatorship of the Kim Jong Dynasty of the Northern Korean Peninsula. The use
of propaganda to cultivate an image of Kim Jong-Un, like his father before him,
is meant to portray to the people who live under his rule, a fantasy of a
perfect, unquestionable, infallible, “great leader”, in order to satiate and
subdue the people under his dominion. It is in this creation of an image of
trustworthiness that the liar builds a bubble around himself which grows and
extends to those who come to trust in him, eventually creating a public sphere
encased in, and based on lies, or as Arendt puts it, “the modern manipulation
of facts.”
As mentioned earlier when
discussing Habermas’s description of the birth of the media, Arendt also draws
a correlation between a vulnerable public sphere’s relationship to capitalism
and the media: “Even in the free world where the government has not monopolized
the power to decide and tell what factually is or is not, gigantic interest
organizations have generalized a kind of raison d’etat frame of mind such as
was formerly restricted to the handling of foreign affairs… national propaganda
on the government level has learned more than a few tricks from business
practices…Images made for domestic consumption…become a reality for everybody
and first of all for the image-makers themselves…in the act of preparing their
‘products’…the result is that a whole group of people, and even whole nations,
may take their bearings from a web of deceptions[15]…”
Discussing truth in relation to
politics and the involvement of the public in government becomes a problem of
trust. While Arendt may lead one to believe that politicians, as a consequence
of being politicians, can never be trusted to tell truths that would not benefit
them, further their ambitions, or advance the goals of those they are aligned
with, Habermas’s account of the bourgeoisie’s ascendance to power through the
advancement of knowledge provides a somewhat contradictory conclusion. The idea
that there is power in truth relies on the assumption that there is proof to
substantiate and validate this apparent truth. If a supposed truth is spread to
the public, unverified by reliable information or substantial analytical
research, and is portrayed to the public as a truth, and this is then discovered
by the public to have been in fact, an untruth, there are lasting consequences,
regardless of the immediate effects that might follow this discovery. One would
assume that this would result in a degrading of the credibility of the teller
of the untruth. But as we have seen countless times, most remarkably in the
last year, the influence that the teller of the untruth has over the public
sphere is a much more consequential factor than the information and its
validity or ability to be verified. Therefore, the resulting casualty of the
discovery of an untruth is not the credibility of the teller, but the concept
of truth itself. If a public that is more concerned with the ideological
alignment of the source of its information, has a role in the levers of government,
there should be no reason to believe that such a government would have any
ability to continue running in such a fashion. A democracy, accountable to a
public that is swayed by personality more than objective, factual truths,
cannot be called a democracy at all. It becomes a dictatorship ruled by
flattery and cronyism, in the guise of a democracy.
So, what is to be done if the
American Democratic Republic that we hold to such a high esteem is, as I seem
to be suggesting, becoming some kind of kleptocratic, authoritarian form of
government? Our salvation from what is hopefully just my own apocalyptic
hyperbole, may be found right under our noses. It is in the concept of power
and who wields it. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. addresses the concept of power in The Politics of Hope[16]
in which he uses Reinhold Niebuhr’s, often theologically related views on
politics, in a relevant context – “’All life is an expression of power’;
therefore all political calculations had to begin and end with power. So long
as power remained in society, mankind could obviously never escape the
necessity of endowing those who possess it with the larger measure of ethical
self-control…there is no ethical force strong enough to place inner check upon
the use of power if its quantity is inordinate.’ He quoted Madison with
approval: ‘The truth is that all men having power ought to be distrusted.’…If
this analysis were right, Niebuhr concluded, ‘an uneasy balance of power would
seem to become the highest goal to which society could aspire.’”[17]
A balancing of power, a system of checks and balances, a free and equal society
based on a pursuit of knowledge and greater understanding of truth; these are
the ideals that seem to be what many believe to be the way that democracy can
achieve its goal of viability. But some of these ideals do not ring true about
American society today. It is not a “free and equal society” and it is now
beginning to seem like it is not a society that believes in “the pursuit of
knowledge and a greater understanding of truth.” On this Schlesinger draws from
John Dewey’s ideas about the possibilities for knowledge in a public sphere:
“Dewey affirmed in naturalistic terms the capacity of man to achieve beneficent
social change through education and experiment. Social progress could be
reliably attained, Dewey emphasized, by the planned and experimental techniques
which had won such brilliant success in the natural sciences. In fine, the
organized social intelligence could be counted on to work out definite
solutions to the great political and economic issues. If all this were so, why
was society still so far from man’s ideal? The answer Dewey suggested, was
primarily ignorance, which made man unaware of his potentialities, and
prejudice, which prevented him from acting scientifically to realize them; the
answer, in short, was cultural lag. And as the remedy for ignorance was
education, so the remedy for prejudice was science.”[18]
The ideas of Niebuhr and Dewey taken together help to discover what may be the
prescription for the virus that has affected the organs of truth in the
contemporary public sphere which is afflicted with the symptom of adoration for
the politically and culturally ascendant fame
aristocracy.
Considering the fact that Habermas
and Arendt were both German in the middle of the 20th century, their
prescience and familiarity with authoritarian oppression and the methods such
rule employs, should come as no surprise. Having witnessed, and experienced
first-hand, Nazi control of Germany and the effect that Adolf Hitler had on the
public sphere of Germany, Europe and the entire world, their writings are
imbued with an understanding of these concepts to an extent that few others
would be capable of elucidating. In using specifically Habermas’s depiction of
the public sphere and Arendt’s definitions of truth in the realm of politics, we
can come closer to understanding truth’s relationship to the public sphere, how
a majority consensus is reached and the effect that this has on democracy if
allowed to go unchecked. By viewing American democracy in its current state
through this lens, and by using Schlesinger’s examination of power through the
works of Niebuhr and Dewey, educated
knowledge and the important relationship it must have to power in order
for power to be reined in and divided equally, is made even more profound.
While the bourgeoisie may have excluded from their ranks such a significant
portion of the total population because education was essentially available
only to the wealthy, it does not render obsolete the fact that their education
was the reason they were able to create a society where not only those born
into power could ever have access to it. The assault on truth and the
degradation of the apparent importance of knowledge to the political relevance
of the public sphere are alarming to many who believe that a democracy can only
be maintained by the involvement of an educated and politically engaged public
sphere. While recent developments are sufficient reason for panic, it is in the
separation of powers within the American government and – though it may not be
the sexiest of potential heros – the existence of a complicated bureaucracy,
may be the best hope for a resurgence of the relevance of intellectuals and
experts. While this theory may be brushed aside as naïve and elitist, judging
by the confluence of these examinations of truth, the public and power, and
having at least a cursory knowledge of the American form of Republican
Democracy, it seems more likely that an ignorant, brutish demagogue would fail
to maintain control of such an intricate and demanding mechanism of governance,
than wield it effectively to advance their gains. The fame aristocracy may be a much more formidable force than was first
assumed, but being uneducated, vain, and exposed to the public has its
downsides too.
[1] Habermas, Jürgen. 1991. The Structural transformation of
the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society.
Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.
[2] Wiggershaus, Rolf. 1994. The Frankfurt School: its
history, theories and political significance. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Page 561
[4]
Ibid
[11] Truth and Politics, The portable Hannah Arendt,
page 549
[12] Truth and Politics, The portable Hannah
Arendt, page 563
[13] Truth and Politics, The portable Hannah
Arendt, page 564
[14] Truth and Politics, The portable Hannah
Arendt, page 566
[15] Truth and Politics, The portable Hannah
Arendt, page 567
[16] Schlesinger, Arthur M. 1962. The Politics of Hope.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Riverside Press Cambridge.
[17] The Politics of Hope, page 109
[18] The Politics of Hope, page 101
